Is speech necessary for the capacities it is said to ensure? Perhaps not in the case of the first three, more purely psychological abilities; almost certainly, in the case of the other capacities, which have a social-psychological character. Philip Pettit is L. Lecture abstracts can be viewed here. In the narrow sense, rationality is about proper reasoning, and about thinking or acting in accord with such reasoning.
Even narrow rationality ineliminably involves attitudes and dispositions that cannot themselves be exercises of reasoning, on pain of regress.
But how, if not by reasoning, can such attitudes and dispositions become well-attuned or sensitive to reasons? We will proceed likewise, taking advantage of recent work in both philosophy and psychology to move the project forward and increase its descriptive and potentially explanatory depth.
This in turn can help us make progress in large-scale debates in philosophy that often depend upon conceptions of desire, belief, and action—e. On these questions, I will be using the account developed of desire, belief, and action to defend cognitivism and realism, and, at the end, to respond to recent criticisms of moral cognitivism and realism on psychological, neuroscientific, and evolutionary grounds—the weight of the evidence, I suggest, lies on the vindicative rather than debunking side of these debates. How much can we learn from the armchair? The answer turns out to be quite a lot.
The aim is to show how it is possible for us to to know, from the armchair, that we are agents in a spatio-temporal world that may well contain other agents; that there are things that we ought to do simply in virtue of being agents; that many of these things correspond to what we ordinarily take to be moral requirements; that there may well be other things we ought to do that correspond to what we ordinarily take to be requirements of love and friendship, and that these nearly always have, but are not exhausted by, a moral dimension; and that there may well be yet other things still that we ought to do that express the interests we have in art objects and aspects of nature.
When we leave the armchair and remind ourselves that we are embodied human beings who live among others in a complex physical and social world, we further discover that we are typically subject to all of these requirements, and we also discover, disappointingly, that we have a limited capacity to act in accordance with them. This sets the scene for a number of practical problems. We solve some of these problems by developing and exercising our capacity for self-control, and we solve others by cooperating with other agents to develop and implement formal and informal ways of regulating our interactions with each other and with the non-agential parts of the world.
First-order metaphysical questions are sensitive to a second-order question, that of the appropriate concepts for framing first-order questions. It makes a big difference whether one views metaphysics through a modal lens, or through the lens of conceptual analysis, or through the lens of ground. The lectures will take place at 5pm on Wednesdays in weeks 1 to 6 of Trinity Term, or 29th April to 3rd June inclusive, and will be given at the Grove Auditorium in Magdalen College, Oxford.
Please note: admissions to the Auditorium will be strictly limited to the seating capacity, without exception. There will be a drinks reception after the first lecture.
What we do with words can help or hinder justice in ways that exploit rules of accommodation: a process of adjustment that tends to make speech acts count as 'correct play'. Accommodation can enable speakers and hearers to build unjust norms and distributions of authority, sexual subordination, and racial hatred. Accommodation can undermine knowledge, by disguising injustice, altering standards and stakes, and destroying credibility.
Attending to these dangers makes visible certain solutions. Accommodation reveals speech acts as something we do together with words: the acts and omissions of hearers, as well as speakers, contribute to what is done. Free speech itself looks different, demanding richer resources: state and individual action, not just inaction, could be needed to make it real.
Download Truth, Etc.: Six Lectures On Ancient Logic
The John Locke Lecture series were held at 5 p. The lectures were given at the Grove Auditorium, Magdalen College. The first seminar was on 19 May, from 2pm to 5pm, and at this seminar chapters 2 and 3 of the manuscript see below were discussed. The second seminar was on 2 June, from 3pm to 6pm. The first half of that seminar was on chapters 4 and 5; the second half, on chapters 6 and 7. Anger is not just ubiquitous, it is also popular — even among philosophers.
Many people think it is impossible to care sufficiently for justice without anger at injustice. Many also believe that it is impossible for individuals to vindicate their own self-respect adequately without anger. These lectures will argue that anger is conceptually confused and normatively pernicious.
It is neither normatively appropriate nor productive in either the personal or the political life. It also introduces a sub-argument concerning forgiveness: rather than being the normatively benign alternative to anger that many people believe it to be, forgiveness at least as standardly defined all too often proves a covert form of anger, extracting humiliation as a condition of forgoing angry attitudes. With the help of an example, I argue that anger is almost always normatively flawed in one of two ways. Either it wrongly supposes that punishing the aggressor could make good a past damage — an idea of cosmic balance with deep roots in the human psyche but nonsensical — or, in the case where the angry person focuses exclusively on offense to relative status, it may possibly make sense a relative lowering of the offender does effect a relative raising of the victim , but the exclusive focus on status is normatively problematic.
I then discuss a concept that I call the Transition: a constructive segue from backward-looking anger to constructive thought about the future. And I identify one species of anger that I do consider normatively unproblematic, which I call Transition-Anger. I also discuss the connection between anger and a displaced sense of helplessness, and examine a possible role for empathy in extricating oneself from the trap of anger. It is commonly thought that people who have been wronged by intimates ought to be angry, because they owe it to their self-respect so to react.
This lecture a very short form of chapter 4 on the website contests that claim, discussing anger between intimate partners and anger between adult children and their parents but focusing on the latter for reasons of time.
I end with a discussion of self-anger. In all cases I pursue my sub-theme of forgiveness, arguing that generosity, and not the extraction of apologies, Is what we need. Many people think that the institutions of the legal system ought to embody the spirit of justified anger, and they defend a picture of criminal punishment along these lines. In keeping with the forward-looking and constructive attitude I have defended previously, I criticized criminal law retributivism and defend a Millean not exactly Benthamite form of welfarism, looking at the implications of these ideas for several specific aspects of the criminal justice system victim impact statements, shame-based penalties, juvenile justice conferencing, mercy at the sentencing phase.
I insist, however, that the ex post focus of the criminal justice system is actually a narrow part of the task of a good society in dealing with crime. Forward-looking strategies should focus above all on education, health care, nutrition, and inclusion in the political process.
This lecture is a short form of chapter 6 on the website.
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When there is great injustice, it is very tempting to think that righteous anger is the best response, and even a necessary response. Studying the thought and practice of these three leaders, I argue that non-anger is both normatively and practically superior to anger. This lecture is a short form of chapter 7 from the website. How philosophical issues about perception are transformed in the light of the science of perception. Does conscious perception have representational content?
Or are the representations involved in perception all sub-personal underpinnings of perception rather than partly constitutive of perception itself? Is seeing always seeing-as? Is seeing-as always conceptual? Do we see things only as having colors, shapes and textures? Or do we see things as being CD players or baseball bats? Is perception a form of judgment? Must conscious perception be cognitively accessible to the subject? Is attention required for object perception or knowledge of the reference of perceptual demonstratives?
These lectures argue that these and other related philosophical issues are transformed by taking into account the science of perception. Facts about attention and its relation to the phenomenology of perception are problematic for the major philosophical approaches to perception. There is a minimal resolution of object-seeing that is finer than a corresponding minimal resolution of object-attention, so object-attention is not required for object-seeing.
No reasonable version of a de re thought potential requirement on seeing conflicts with this grain difference. These ideas solve a version of the speckled hen problem. Some say that seeing is always seeing-as and that seeing-as involves conceptualization. Some say that not only can we see things as having certain colors, shapes and textures; we can see things as being a table or a car. One of the most important issues concerning the foundations of conscious perception centers on the question of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse.
Recently, the overflow argument has been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This lecture reviews the controversy, focusing on the power of unconscious processes and arguing that what we know about unconscious processing suggests that consciousness does overflow cognition. There are reliably reproducible states that have little or no reportability but do not have many of the signature properties of unconscious states.
This lecture discusses whether these states might be phenomenally conscious in the light of the close conceptual tie between conscious perception and first person authority. Clark and Chalmers famously argued that the cognitive mind extends beyond the brain into the body and the world. If I can fluidly access the phone number from a suitable source outside my body, we should allow that I know it now. Mark as duplicate.
Truth, etc.: Six Lectures on Ancient Logic
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Revision history. This entry has no external links. Add one. Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server Configure custom proxy use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy. Configure custom resolver. Truth, Etc. Jonathan Barnes - - Oxford University Press. Nicholas Denyer - - Philosophical Quarterly 58 — Logical Matters. Jonathan Barnes - - Clarendon Press.
Early Greek Philosophy. Jonathan Barnes - - Penguin Books. Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction. Francesco Ademollo - - Philosophical Review 4 Immaterial Causes. Ancient Skepticism and Causation. Jonathan Barnes - - In Burnyeat ed.